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A SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE DEVICE
FOR DEALING WITH ABUSES
OF CRIMINAL RECORDS
Walter W. Steele, Jr.*
Criminal records, such as records of arrests and records of
convictions, are so generally available and frequently utilized in
the United States that most people assume their use to be entirely
legitimate. However, the ready availability and wide dis-
semination of such records is an important source of a certain
socio-legal stigma borne by those persons processed in the crimi-
nal justice system. Subjecting a person to the criminal justice
system may not only affect his civil rights and increase his chan-
ces for heavier penalties upon subsequent convictions, but may
also taint his image in the community at large.1
A discrepancy exists: although some measure of due process is
required when a person is arrested, 2 jailed,3 tried,4 or sentenced,
5
the stigma of a criminal record attaches automatically, without a
semblance of due process. Two recent developments, however,
have caused increased awareness of this discrepancy and of the
concomitant need to guard against untoward use of criminal
records.6 The first was an increase in the number of educated
Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law. LL.B.,
1957, Southern Methodist University: LL.M., 1969, University of Texas.
I The United States Supreme Court has held that because of the fact that most criminal
convictions entail adverse collateral legal consequences, a criminal case does not become
moot upon the expiration of the sentence imposed. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790
(1969): Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968). See also Special Project, The
Colhueral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970), an
extensive article dealing with the civil disabilities resulting from a criminal conviction.
Many of these disabilities, such as loss of property and domestic rights or the offender's
ability to obtain occupational licensing, arguably contribute to his loss of social status.
2 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304-05 (1967) (dictum).
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456-58 (1966) (dictum).
4
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145. 149 (1968).
5
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,
137 (1967).
6 Illustrating this growing contemporary concern is the proposed Criminal Justice In-
formation Systems Security and Privacy Act of 1971, S. 2546, 92d Cong.. Ist Sess.
(1971), also introduced as H.R. 10789, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), and H.R. 10892, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as S. 2546]. Hearings on the proposed bill were
held June 29, 1972. 197 1-72 CCH CONGRESSIONAL INDEx 2466. The differences between
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middle- and upper-class young people being arrested, primarily for
drug offenses or political demonstrations. 7 The second was the
introduction of computers to maintain and disseminate in-
formation about criminal records on a centralized basis. Ob-
viously, a centralized computer, filled with criminal records, and
available to a multitude of users, enhances the dangers of the
improper use of these records.8
Seemingly, the purpose of the socio-legal stigma which attaches
to every person processed in the criminal justice system is to
protect the general public; but the public needs protection only
from relatively few people involved in comparatively few crimes.9
That the stigma attaches to an excessive number of people may be
a result of the imbalance in the competing interests. On one side
are the people with a criminal record, who alone represent their
interests. On the other side are the interests of employers and
business associates, law enforcement agencies, courts, prose-
cutors, and the public at large.
the proposed bill, S. 2546, and the statute proposed herein are indicated in notes 80-85
infra.
7 Few realize the rate at which records of arrests are made in this country. For example,
5,773,988 arrests were reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1969
alone. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 107-08 (1969). Through the years the fingerprints of over 85,000,000
people have been placed in FBI files. These files do not lie dormant; the FBI receives
about 29,000 requests for fingerprint checks per day. FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN-
VESTIGATION, 1970 ANN. REP. 33.
8 The threat of the computer in this respect has been recognized by the United States
Congress. Subsection 7(7) of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3767(b) (1970), provides that
Not later than May I, 1971, the [Law Enforcement Assistance] Adminis-
tration shall submit to the President and to the Congress recommendations
for legislation ... promoting the integrity and accuracy of criminal justice
data collection, processing, and dissemination systems funded in whole or in
part by the Federal Government, and protecting the constitutional rights of
all persons covered or affected by such systems.
It is possible that in the foreseeable future states will be required to comply with
congressional standards for the maintenance of criminal records as a condition to receiving
federal money. It follows, therefore, that the luxury of ignoring the plight of persons
stigmatized by a criminal record may soon be a thing of the past. In order to obtain their
share of federal money, states may be forced to deal with the questions of how best to
collect and disseminate criminal records for legitimate purposes, while at the same time
protecting "the constitutional rights of all persons covered or affected by such systems."
Id.
9 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 88-92 (1967).
Clearly, the public interest demands that various disabilities and disqualifications attach
to persons who engage in some types of criminal activity. No one would advocate hiring a
convicted embezzler as a bank teller, or a convicted robber as a security guard. If
appropriate disabilities and disqualifications are to attach to certain kinds of criminal
activity, the records of that activity must be available. Nevertheless, according to current
practices, no matter how blameless or rehabilitated a person might be, his criminal record
will haunt and follow him. Thus, the problem with criminal records is not that they are
used, but rather how they are used.
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Another plausible explanation for tolerating pervasive stigmati-
zation of persons with criminal records is the lack of a workable
alternative. One of the most obvious alternatives is to expunge,
under proper circumstances, all or portions of a criminal record.
But, as one author has commented, "Statutes approaching ex-
pungement legislation have been enacted only in a minority of
states. None in practice has succeeded in accomplishing what the
philosophy of expungement seeks to do."' 10 One drawback to
expungement is that criminal records are located in so many
different places that it is impractical to fashion an order to ex-
punge them all." Furthermore, because of the very real and
legitimate interests of the public in knowing about some types of
past criminal activity, expungement statutes are often so riddled
with exceptions that they are of little practical use.'
2
Another suggested alternative for lessening the impact of a
criminal record is to narrow the spectrum of persons or in-
stitutions who may hold or receive the records. This, too, is
unworkable in practice because of the difficulty of enforcing rules
of limited access among diverse institutions, such as all courts and
police departments. Furthermore, rules of limited access do not
normally prevent an employer from asking a prospective employ-
ee whether he has ever been arrested or convicted.'
3
There are other pitfalls apparent in ameliorating the overuse of
criminal records. For example, techniques of expunging, sealing,
and limiting access do not affect legal status. No amount of
expunging, or sealing, or limiting access is truly useful unless civil
rights, such as the right to vote, are restored as well.' 4 Another
problem is the inherent breadth of a criminal record, which can
involve acts or allegations of acts ranging from traffic offenses to
murder or rape. Thus, it is difficult to draw precise guidelines
delineating those parts of the record which may be legitimately
used. The apparently illegitimate use of criminal records does not
lend itself to easy solution. The aims of this article are to explore
some abuses of criminal records and to offer some tentative solu-
tions, primarily in the form of a proposed statute.
10 Comment. Criminal Records ofArrest and Conviction: Expungement from the Gen-
eralPublicAccess, 3 CALIF. W.L. REV. 121, 125 (1967).
11 See Kogon & Loughery, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big
Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 378 (1970).
12 See Note, The Effect of Expungement on a Criminal Conviction, 40 S. CAL. L. REV.
127, 132-43 (1967).
13 For a discussion of some existing statutory approaches to the problem, see Gough,
The Expungement ofAdjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders:A Problem of
Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147 (1966); Comment, supra note 10.
14 Cf. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 152(2) (McKinney Supp. 197 1), giving one convicted ofa
felony the right to vote upon the expiration of his sentence or his discharge from parole.
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1. COLLECTING AND CIRCULATING CRIMINAL
RECORDS
If the illegitimate use of criminal records unreasonably embar-
rasses and prejudices those people subjected to the criminal jus-
tice system, then the collection and distribution of criminal
records should be reexamined. 15 This reexamination should estab-
lish by what authority criminal records are collected and dis-
tributed, determine whether arrest records should be subject to
the same treatment as conviction records, and ascertain the ben-
efits of utilizing records of arrests and convictions.
In most cases, the police make a written record of the fact that
a person has been arrested. 16 This record generally states the
reason for the arrest and includes the arrestee's name, finger-
prints, and photograph. The courts look upon this record as a
customary facet of arrest, implicit in the police function.' 7 Ac-
cording to one court, "The taking of the fingerprints in the first
place and the whole process of arrest of a possibly innocent
person are a humiliation to which he must submit for the benefit
of society."' 8 Moreover, several courts have held that the return
or destruction of an arrest record is entirely within the discretion
of the police department, absent a statute to the contrary. 19
One study indicates that approximately 40 percent of the male
children in the United States will be arrested for a nontraffic
offense sometime during their lives. 20 Therefore, the nation's po-
lice departments have considerable discretionary power over in-
formation that is potentially damaging to a large segment of the
American public. The mere fact that police have that information
is not particularly threatening. The threat arises when the police
release the information to someone outside the realm of law
enforcement. That practice appears to be common: one court in
New York City has taken judicial notice that private investigators
have access to police records.
21
15 As a result of a thorough analysis of the impact of criminal records upon its citizens,
the District of Columbia has implemented certain changes, described in Morrow v.
District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 731, 740-43 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
16 Note. Retention and Dissemination of A rrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 U. C HI.
L. REV. 850, 850-53 (197 1).
17 See, e.g., Shannon v. State, 207 Ark. 658, 660, 182 S.W.2d 384, 384-85 (1944);
Hansson v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
18 Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J. Eq. 9, 10, 39 A.2d 851 (Ch. 1944), cited with approval
in Roesch v. Ferber, 48 N.J. Super. 231, 240, 137 A.2d 61, 69 (App. Div. 1957).
19 See cases collected in Note, supra note 16. at 854 n.20.
2 0 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 247 (1967).
21 In the Matter of Smith, 63 Misc. 2d 198, 200 n.4. 310 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 n.4 (N.Y.
City Fain. Ct. 1970).
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The rationale underlying the practice of keeping arrest records,
as stated by one court, is that
[a]rrest records are available in uncovering criminal conduct,
they play a significant role in the prosecutor's exercise of
discretion, they greatly aid in setting bond, determining sen-
tences an[d] facilitating the work of penal and other in-
stitutions of correction.
22
The problem stemming from the abuse of this practice is to seek a
balance of conflicting interests. The humiliation of those arrested,
resulting from having an arrest record which can be illegitimately
used to their detriment must be weighed against the value of
arrest records as a law enforcement tool and their consequent
benefit to the public. Predictably, the courts tend to favor the
public interest when striking the balance on the issue of collecting
and circulating criminal records. 23 However, we should not over-
look the fact that essentially the same two competing interests,
i.e., the individual and law enforcement, were balanced when the
exclusionary rule was devised; in that instance the balance was
struck in favor of the individual.24
There are some obvious differences between records of con-
viction and records of arrest. A conviction follows a trial, with all
its attendant forms of due process, while an arrest results from
either a warrant issued ex parte or a decision made by an in-
dividual policeman in the course of his patrol. Therefore, con-
viction records can be deemed more reliable and meaningful than
arrest records. Furthermore, trials not followed by a conviction
may be followed by an acquittal, which will also be recorded. A
record of acquittal, amounting to a judicial admission that the
defendant is not guilty of the crime charged, can be as widely
disseminated as a record of conviction. Where arrest records are
concerned, however, there is nothing corresponding to a record of
22 Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 727 (D.D.C. 1971). Cf. Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957).
23 For example, in sustaining against constitutional attack a law under which defendant's
fingerprints and photograph were obtained and held, the court in State ex rel. Mavity v.
Tyndall. 225 Ind. 360, 366, 74 N.E.2d 914, 9 17 (194) said:
With full recognition of the rights of the citizen we must nevertheless hold
that the safety of the people is the first law and this law must prevail even as
against some of the apparent rights of privacy.
Further illustration of the point is seen in cases which refise to interfere with discretionary
dissemination of criminal records by police. Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 Ill. App. 2d 8 I, 142
N.E.2d 818 (1957); Poyer v. Boustead, 3 Ill. App. 2d 562, 122 N.E.2d 838 (1954): State
ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153 S.W.2d 834 (1941); Hansson v. Harris, 252
S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
24 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
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acquittal. In fact, many arrest records do not indicate any dis-
position at all.
25
Although there are obvious differences in form, records of
conviction are collected and disseminated by law enforcement
agencies much in the same way as records of arrest. It is therefore
probable that conviction records, like arrest records, are available
for illegitimate use. Similarly, persons with conviction records are
denied employment opportunities in much the same way as those
with arrest records, at times with the approval of the courts. 26
A state statute or a judgment of a state court restricting the use
of criminal records would not extend beyond the state boundaries.
There is recent precedent, however, suggesting that federal courts
have jurisdiction over criminal records maintained by a state. In
Mendez v. Aponte,27 the petitioner alleged that she had been
unconstitutionally convicted of a minor offense in the District
Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Although the con-
viction was final and a fine had been paid, the petitioner sought
return of all records of that conviction because of the adverse
consequences such records would have on her reputation. The
United States District Court in Puerto Rico agreed with the
petitioner, and invoked its jurisdiction under Section 198328 to
order the judge and the clerk of the District Court of the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico to deliver up all records, documents,
entries, references, and papers relative to the petitioner's trial and
conviction.29
Issues of jurisdictional authority to restrict the collection and
circulation of criminal records become more complex when the
record has been sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
by the local police.3 0 Local police, state police, and the FBI
exchange their criminal record files on a reciprocal basis. The FBI
25 E.g., in Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 719, 722 (D.D.C. 1971) the court stated:
While the [FBII has vigorously sought to develop complete records and
particularly to learn of dispositions resulting from each arrest, this effort has
not been successful due to the failure of arresting agencies to send in
follow-up data on forms provided.
26E.g., "Barring convicted felons from certain employment is a familiar legislative
device to insure against corruption in specified vital areas." DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S.
144, 158-59 (1960).
27 294 F. Supp. 311 (D. P.R. 1969). See also United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734,
749-50 (5th Cir. 1967): Hughes v. Rizzo. 282 F. Supp. 88 1, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
2842 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
29 294 F. Supp. at 316.
30 The Attorney General of the United States is authorized to acquire, collect, classify,
and preserve identification, criminal identification, crime, and other records and to ex-
change these records with authorities of the federal government, the states, the cities, and
penal and other institutions. 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1970). The FBI is authorized to perform
these services for the Attorney General. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1972).
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maintains the central depository for this information, and it cur-
rently has information on some sixty million arrests of approx-
imately nineteen million people.3 1 These records are shared with
approximately 8,000 different agencies across the United States,
including many state or county officials, banks insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Civil Service
Commission, and some hospitals. 3 2 Therefore, local attempts to
limit the collection and circulation of criminal records are of little
consequence unless there are also some limitations placed on use
of the central files maintained by the federal government.
The recent case of Menard v. Mitchell33 has thoroughly consid-
ered the problem of restricting the use of central files. Menard
was arrested and later released without charges by the Los Angel-
es, California, police. The Los Angeles police forwarded a record
of his arrest to the FBI. Menard brought suit in federal court
seeking to have the FBI remove his record from its files. The
court denied Menard's request, holding that after exhausting his
administrative remedies, he could seek relief in the California
state courts, who may order a local police agency to request that
the FBI remove a record from the central files and return it. 34 The
FBI automatically honors such requests by returning the record
to the local agency without retaining a copy in its files. Therefore,
by limiting the authority of the police agencies to collect and
transmit those records, or by requiring them to seek return of
records already transmitted, a state legislature or state court can
alleviate the abusive uses of criminal records.
3 5
1I. THE EFFECT OF A CRIMINAL RECORD
ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
More than fifty million people in the United States have a
criminal record of some form.3 6 Their opportunity to secure em-
ployment is limited, despite the fact that the United States Su-
preme Court has declared that "[tihe right to follow any of the
common occupations of life is an inalienable right .... ,,37 To
make matters worse, many of these people have never been
31 These figures do not include records of conviction. Menard v. Mitchell. 328 F. Supp.
718,721 (D.D.C. 1971).
32 Id. at 721- 22.
33 Id. at 718, on remand from 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
34 328 F. Supp. at 723-24.
35 See generally T.N.G. v. Superior Court. 4 Cal. 3d 767. 777 n. 12, 94 Cal. Rptr. 813,
819 n.12,484 P.2d 981, 987 n.12 (1971).36Note, Employment of Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 306 at 306 (1970).
37 Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., I I I U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (dictum).
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convicted of a crime, but merely arrested and subsequently re-
leased. Despite the almost sacrosanct legal presumption that
those who have not been convicted are innocent, employers at-
tempt to screen out prospective employees who have any criminal
record.
A. Discriminatory Hiring
Several phenomena combine to deny job opportunities to
people with a criminal record.3 8 Foremost is the ease with which a
prospective employer may learn of the record.3 9 Many law en-
forcement agencies make that information available on request.
Furthermore, most employers routinely ask job applicants to re-
veal whether or not they have a record. Although some jurisdic-
tions have enacted expungement legislation, employers, law en-
forcement agencies, and even the courts have ignored the policy
of that legislation. For example, in the case of Taylor v. Macy
40
the petitioner was discharged from his job after his employer had
learned of his conviction for an offense, even though that con-
viction had been expunged. In upholding the right of the employer
to discharge the petitioner the court commented:
W]hile the State of California has forgiven the petitioner ....
the acts continue to exist and it would be absurd to find that
the executive authorities were arbitrary and capricious in
considering these expunged convictions .... 41
Another reason that persons with criminal records have
difficulty obtaining jobs is aptly expressed in the following quota-
tion:
I think that the chief handicap that this [person arrested] has
is that for the rest of his life, when he seeks employment, he
will have, in many cases, and perhaps most cases, to admit to
the prospective employer that yes, indeed, he was once ar-
rested, and he will, perhaps, try to explain the circumstances.
38 The weight of law and opinion is set against employment of ex-criminals. At
least in the areas of public employment and licensing, this position is a sad
commentary on the state's opinion of its ability to reform offenders. The
position is also self-sustaining: each refusal to hire an ex-criminal contributes
to a massive barrier to employment and thus encourages recidivism, which in
turn justifies the next refusal to hire.
Note, stepra note 36. at 317.
3
9 See, e.g., A. M ILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 34-35 (1971): Karst, "The Files": Legal
Controls over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 365-66 (1966).
40 252 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
41 Id. at 1023.
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Perhaps the employer will be satisfied with the explanation,
but many times, I think, you'll find that the employer doesn't
want to be bothered .... I think it's human nature on his part
to hire the guy whose record is perfectly clean.
42
The attitude of the employer gives rise to a curious incongruity.
Although there is strong public sentiment demanding that prison
inmates work,43 an ex-convict has difficulty obtaining a job not
because of his unwillingness to work, but because he is an
ex-convict. The incongruity is that there is considerable interest in
a convict's being productive while he is incarcerated, but once he
is released, and again a potential danger to society, there is very
little interest in his being usefully and gainfully employed.
Obviously employers must have a right to know about criminal
records in some cases; otherwise, it would be difficult to avoid an
anomalous result such as employing an embezzler as a bank teller
or a robber as a security guard. It nonetheless seems equally
apparent that an employer's right to know should be balanced
against the public's interest in obtaining full employment for per-
sons with criminal records. 44 The notion that public interests
might override the private interests of employers is not new, but it
has yet to include persons with criminal records. For example, a
New York statute prohibits employment discrimination against
ex-mental patients. 45 Doubtlessly, many New Yorkers would
prefer to discriminate against ex-mental patients, but the public
interest prohibits it. Another example of balancing public interests
against private interests in employment is found in federal civil
rights legislation which denies employers the right to discriminate
by race, sex, or age. 46 Similar statutes covering persons with
criminal records could be drafted, but without greater public sup-




Occupational licensing by the state likewise discriminates
42 Hearings Before the California Assembly Committee on Criminal Procedure at 4
(June 10, 1964) (remarks of John O'Connell, Commissioner of the California Industrial
Accident Commission).
43 Hard labor sentences, one indicator of this public sentiment, are an integral part of
the penal law of some jurisdictions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 342 (Supp. 1970):
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 748-4. 748-7 (1968): MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL § 127
(1969) (included in 10 U.S.C.A. following § 856 (Supp. 1972)).
44 See notes 82 and 84 and accompanying text infra.
4-1 N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 70(5) (McKinney 1971).
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
47 For an interesting discussion of the civil rights model as a solution to the employment
problems of persons with criminal records, see Note, supra note 36, at 317-20.
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against persons with criminal records. Consequently, as vocation-
al activities are increasingly brought under licensing statutes, per-
sons with criminal records find diminishing opportunities for
work.48 In 1889, the Supreme Court of the United States recog-
nized a state's power to set standards for certain occupations a9
As originally conceived, that power represented the balance
struck between the individual citizen's right to work and the
state's obligation to protect its citizens. 50 Frequently, however,
licensing protects licensees more than it protects the public. In-
creasing numbers of occupational groups demand and receive
licensing legislation to deter competition and to satisfy a desire for
a symbol of professional status.51 As a result the delicate balance
between the individual's right to work and the state's power to
protect the public has unwittingly shifted in favor of the state.
There can be no doubt that the Supreme Court originally intended
to limit the state's power to license. In an early case on the
subject, the Court stated:
To justify the Staters] ... interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear- First, that the interests of the
public ... require such interference; and, second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
52
Most states automatically deny liccnses to persons with crimi-
nal records. 53 The public interest has prevailed to the extent that
it is expeditious to exclude all applicants -with criminal records
rather than provide machinery for exercising some sound dis-
cretion among these applicants. Even the Supreme Court has
generalized about the fitness of people with conviction records to
receive a license:
It is not open to doubt that the commission of crime, the
violation of the penal laws of a State, has some relation to the
48 See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733. 734, 747 (1964).
49 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (dictum).
50 It is undoubtedly true that it is the right of every citizen of the United States
to pursue any lawful trade or business .... But the possession and enjoy-
ment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed
by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health,
peace, good order and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own
will.
Crowley v. Christensen. 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890) (Field, J.).
S1 Gellhorn. Occupational Licensing-A Nationwide Dilemma, 109 J. AccoUNTANCY
39(1960).
52 Lawton v. Steele. 152 U.S. 133. 137 (1894).
53 Note, supra note 36, at 308- 10.
FALL 19721
Journal of Law Reform
question of character. It is not, as a rule, the good people who
commit crime.5
4
Even where a conviction has been expunged, states have de-
nied licenses to those with criminal records. 55 Persons who have
received a pardon are also likely to be denied a license. 56 The
underlying legal basis for these denials may, however, be chang-
ing. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,57 the Supreme Court
analyzed the power of a state to deny an occupational license to a
person who had an arrest record. While recognizing the power to
insist that licensees be of good character, the Court ruled that
standards of character must have a rational connection to the
occupation in question. As for the presence of an arrest record,
the Court said:
The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little,
if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any
misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more than that someone
probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense.
When formal charges are not filed against the arrested person
and he is released without trial, whatever probative force that
the arrest may have had is normally dissipated.
58
The requirement of a rational connection could also be applied
to a prior conviction. For instance, if a conviction is very old or
for an offense unrelated to the nature of the occupation, there may
not be a legitimate reason to withhold a license. By calling for a
closer examination of the nexus between the criminal record and
the nature of the occupation, 59 licensing statutes could provide a
more realistic balance between the right of the individual to work
and the obligation of the state to protect the public.
111. RECENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS ALLEVIATING
THE ABUSIVE USES OF CRIMINAL RECORDS
Although many foreign countries have limited the availability
and use of criminal records, 60 American courts have historically
been hesitant to intrude into the problems inherent in collecting
54 Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898).
55 Copeland v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 241 Cal. App. 2d 186, 50
Cal. Rptr. 452 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
56 See, e.g., Stone v. Oklahoma Real Estate Comm'n, 369 P.2d 642 (Okla. 1962); Page
v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536. 192 So. 205, 126 A.L.R. 249 (1938).
57 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
58 Id. at 241 (footnote omitted) (Black, J.).
59 See In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907, 131 A.L.R. 226 (1940).
60 Hess & Poole,Abuse of the Record ofArrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 494, 499-501 (1967).
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and disseminating criminal records. 6 1 Recently, however, some
American courts have shown a growing willingness to reexamine
the process by which these records are gathered and to reassess
the present balance between the rights of a person with a criminal
record and the rights of the public. One example of judicial
activism in this area is the Menard v. Mitchell decision discussed
above. 62 The Menard court judicially noticed the fact that crimi-
nal records can be used to the subject's detriment. To alleviate
some of this potential abuse, the court ordered the FBI to make
Menard's criminal record available only to other law enforcement
agencies and only "for strictly law enforcement purposes." 63 The
court also restricted the federal government to the "discreet use
of this information [Menard's record] already in its possession for
its own limited purposes in aid of national security .... "64 The
Menard decision obviously does not provide complete protection,
for some leaks or deliberate misuses are bound to occur in a
records system as large as that in the United States. Nonetheless,
the opinion is an unmistakable effort to enhance the individual's
right to privacy.
Other recent decisions have relied on expungement as a meth-
od to alleviate the potential abuse of criminal records, especially
arrest records. 6 5 Heretofore, courts have established that the police
have the right, if not the duty, to record the fact that a person has
been arrested. 66 That doctrine was aptly expressed in Bartletta v.
McFeely:
Whether any certain prisoner is to be fingerprinted and photo-
graphed is an administrative question to be determined by the
head of the police department making the arrest .... The
police department have [sic] the responsibility of the safety of
the people and they must be given the necessary discretion to
enable them successfully to assume this responsibility.
67
Nevertheless, it is also established doctrine that an individual's
right to privacy may limit the right to disseminate criminal
records. 68 As systems for the collection and dissemination of
61 See cases collected in Note, supra note 16, at 854 n.20: cf. Roesch v. Ferber, 45 N.J.
Super. 149, 131 A.2d 807 (Law Div. 1957), rev'd, 48 N.J. Super. 231, 137 A.2d 61 (App.
Div. 1957).
62 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 197 1). See notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
6 328 F. Supp. at 727.
64 Id.
6.5 E.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1967).
66 Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 117 S.W. 746 (1909): State ex rel. Mavity v.
Tyndall, 225 Ind. 365, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946): Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J. Eq. 9, 39
A.2d 851 (Ch. 1944).
67 Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N.J. Eq. 141. 145. 152 A. 17, 19 (Ch. 1930).68 See Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906): Itzkovitch v. Whitaker,
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criminal records expand, a criminal record arguably becomes part
of what amounts to a nationwide rogue's gallery. The opinion in
United States v. Kalish69 illustrates that some courts are begin-
ning to reconsider the relationship between collecting records and
prohibiting excessive dissemination of those records. Kalish was
arrested, fingerprinted, and photographed by a United States mar-
shal.70 Later, all charges were dismissed, and Kalish sought an
order directing the FBI to expunge his record. 71 The government
argued that there was no statutory authority for such a procedure.
The court sustained Kalish's petition, analyzing the problem as
follows:
There can be no denying the efficacy of fingerprint in-
formation, photographs, and other means of identification in
the apprehension of criminals and fugitives. Law enforcement
agencies must utilize all scientific data in society's nev-
er-ending battle against lawlessness and crime. When ar-
rested, an accused does not have a constitutional right of
privacy that outweighs the necessity of protecting society and
the accumulation of this data, no matter how mistaken the
arrest may have been.
However, when an accused is acquitted of the crime or
when he is discharged without conviction, no public good is
accomplished by the retention of criminal identification
records. On the other hand, a great imposition is placed upon
the citizen. His privacy and personal dignity is [sic] invaded
as long as the Justice Department retains "criminal" identi-
fication records, "criminal" arrest [sic], fingerprints and a
rogue's gallery photograph. 72
Following the Kalish rationale, some states have passed statutes
requiring expungement or sealing of all records upon an acquittal
or dismissal of criminal charges.
73
Automatic expungement upon dismissal or acquittal may be an
overreaction to the need to balance the interests of good law
enforcement against the interests of privacy. Admittedly, cases
may be dismissed, and acquittals may result, for reasons other
than innocence. In recognition of that fact, some courts are fol-
lowing what seems to be a more sophisticated approach. These
115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Downs v. Swann, III Md. 53. 73 A. 653 (1909):
McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (Ch. 1945): Eddy v. Moore, 5
Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
69 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967).
70 Id. at 969.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 970.
73 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-90 (Supp. 1972); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 206-5 (Supp. 1972).
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courts examine such requests for expungement individually in an
effort to determine where the equities lie. For example, the peti-
tioner in Henry v. Looney74 sought to have his arrest record
sealed because he was released from custody without charges
being filed. The state argued both that there was no statutory
authority for sealing the record and that sealing would be
ineffective since it would not protect the petitioner from being
asked whether he had ever been arrested. 75 The court ordered the
record sealed, stating:
At the least, the subject of whether or not petitioner had been
arrested should be opened with petitioner's knowledge rather
than through private investigation, so that petitioner may be
afforded an opportunity to explain fully to those willing to
listen. The protection afforded by the law is worthwhile if it
does no more than assure petitioner that doors will not be
closed, and opportunities precluded, on the basis of an arrest
record, privately uncovered, but never mentioned.
76
In reaching that conclusion, however, the court expressly recog-
nized that "not every arrest record which fails to terminate with a
conviction ... should be automatically expunged .... Con-
victions frequently fail for reasons other than a defendant's in-
nocence."77 Utilizing the same approach, the Washington Court
of Appeals stated in Eddy v. Moore:
We have now reached the point where our experience with
the requirements of a free society demands the existence of a
right of privacy in the fingerprints and photographs of an
accused who has been acquitted, to be at least placed in the
balance, against the claim of the state for a need for their
retention.
We believe the right of an individual, absent a compelling
showing of necessity by the government, to the return of his
fingerprints and photographs, upon an acquittal, is a funda-
mental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
78
These cases represent an unmistakable movement by the courts
away from the conventional laissez-faire attitude, and toward a
willingness to scrutinize the relationship among criminal records,
the abusive use of criminal records, the right to privacy, and the
right to be free from permanent damage to personal reputation.
74 65 Misc. 2d 759, 317 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
75 Id. at 760-6 1, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
76 Id. at 761. 317 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
77 Id. at 762, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 852. Cf. Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14
(D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
78 5 Wash. App. 334,-, 487 P.2d 211, 217 (1971) (emphasis supplied).
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Although these courts appear to be making some progress, judi-
cial remedies are inherently slow and costly. If, in fact, the efforts
by these courts are valid and viable ones, then the goals could be
more directly reached through a statutory solution, which would
be uniformly and expeditiously available.
IV. SUGGESTED STATUTORY REMEDY
Several fundamental considerations are involved in attempting
to draft a statutory solution to the problem of criminal records.
One is that the distinction between a record of arrest and a record
of conviction can be a pivotal one. Another is that a conflict exists
between the public's need to know of criminal records and the
public's desire to facilitate an offender's return to society as a
productive citizen.
Although expungement is the most common approach to the
problem of abusive uses of criminal records, it is often cumber-
some and unworkable. 79 A person who has been arrested is likely
to find that the local police have retained a record of his arrest and
that they have forwarded copies to the state police and the FBI.
Thus, any scheme, whether imposed by a court or by a statute, to
restrict the use of or expunge that record must be broad enough to
deal with at least three different record depositories, each in turn
operated by a different governmental unit: county, state, and
federal.
At least two alternatives to expungement could be effectively
used. One is to limit the scope of distribution or publication of
criminal records. The other alternative is to prevent employers
and licensing agencies from discriminating against persons be-
cause of certain types of criminal records. The statute suggested
below utilizes all three approaches: expungement, limited dis-
tribution, and removal of employment and licensing disabilities.
An attempt has been made to tailor each section of the statute to
one particular aspect of the overall problem, and following each
section is a short commentary describing the problem of concern
in that section and explaining why one particular approach was
chosen rather than any other. The statute deals solely with
records of arrests or convictions. It does not deal in any way with
the issue of restoring civil rights after expungement of a record or
pardon of a conviction.
79 For a listing of expungement statutes, see Special Project, supra note I, at 1148-50 &
nn.619-39.
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CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION ACT
SEC. 1. DEFINITIONS.
(I) "LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY" MEANS
ANY PUBLIC AGENCY WHICH CREATES OR
STORES CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION.
(2) "ARREST RECORD" MEANS ANY ENTRY BY
A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY INTO WRITTEN
RECORDS OR ELECTRONIC DATA BANKS WHICH
IDENTIFIES A PARTICULAR PERSON WHO HAS
BEEN ARRESTED. THE TERM "ARREST RECORD"
SHALL INCLUDE, BUT SHALL NOT BE LIMITED
TO, THE FOLLOWING: PHOTOGRAPHS MADE OF
A PERSON WHILE UNDER ARREST; FINGER-
PRINTS TAKEN OF A PERSON WHILE UNDER AR-
REST; WRITTEN OFFENSE REPORTS DESCRIBING
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF AN ARREST; RECORDS
INDICATING THE FACT THAT A NAMED PERSON
IS OR HAS BEEN IN A JAIL IN CONNECTION WITH
PENDING CHARGES.
(3) "CONVICTION RECORD" MEANS A FINAL
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF A CRIME FOR
WHICH A JAIL TERM MAY BE ASSESSED, TOGETH-
ER WITH ANY SUBSEQUENT ORDERS OR JUDG-
MENTS OF A COURT CONCERNING THE SEN-
TENCE, DETENTION, PROBATION, PAROLE, OR
RELEASE OF A PERSON CONVICTED OF SUCH
CRIME.
(4) "CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION" IN-
CLUDES ARREST RECORDS AND CONVICTION
RECORDS AND ABSTRACTS THEREOF AS WELL
AS RECORDS MAINTAINED BY ANY PUBLIC
AGENCY REGARDING THE DETENTION, PROBA-
TION, PAROLE, OR RELEASE OF A NAMED PER-
SON WHO HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF A CRIME
FOR WHICH A JAIL TERM MAY BE ASSESSED.
(5) "SUPERINTENDENT" MEANS THE SUPERIN-
TENDENT OF THE STATE CRIMINAL RECORD IN-
FORMATION DEPARTMENT.
Comment
These definitions make the essential distinction between a
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record of arrest and a record of conviction." It should be noted
that these definitions are designed to include records maintained
in such places as the offices of prosecutors or grand juries. For
reasons of expediency, conviction records for minor offenses are
not included in the definition of "conviction record" and, con-
sequently, are not subject to expungement under the provisions of
this act. See Sec. 6 infra. However, arrest records for all crimes
are treated in this legislation.
SEC. 2. RESPONSIBILITY TO FORWARD AND
MAINTAIN CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION.
(I) ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, IN-
CLUDING EVERY POLICE DEPARTMENT, SHER-
IFF, CONSTABLE, OR OTHER PUBLIC AGENCY;
CLERKS, JUDGES, OR APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS
OF THE VARIOUS CRIMINAL COURTS; PROSE-
CUTING, PROBATION, AND PAROLE OFFICERS;
HEADS OF EVERY DEPARTMENT, BOARD, COM-
MISSION, BUREAU, OR INSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OR ANY POLITICAL SUBDIVISION THERE-
OF HAVING TO DO WITH ARRESTED OR CON-
VICTED PERSONS SHALL FURNISH CRIMINAL
RECORD INFORMATION TO THE SUPERINTEN-
DENT.
(2) ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY MAY
REQUEST THE SUPERINTENDENT TO FURNISH A
COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF THE CRIMINAL
RECORD INFORMATION CONCERNING ANY PER-
SON.
(3) THE CLERKS, JUDGES, OR APPROPRIATE OF-
FICIALS OF THE VARIOUS COURTS IN THIS
STATE SHALL IMMEDIATELY REPORT TO THE
SUPERINTENDENT THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF
EVERY CRIMINAL CASE IN THAT COURT WHERE-
IN THE ALLEGED CRIME WAS ONE FOR WHICH A
JAIL TERM COULD HAVE BEEN ASSESSED.
(4) IT IS HEREBY MADE THE DUTY OF THE AR-
RESTING OFFICER, OR SUCH OTHER OFFICIAL
AS SHALL BE DESIGNATED BY THE LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, TO REPORT IMME-
80 S. 2546, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(2) (197 I), does not distinguish between arrest and
conviction records. Moreover, that bill does not apply to conviction records maintained by
the judicial system, but only to those records maintained by any agency funded, in whole
or in part, by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Id. § 2(l).
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DIATELY TO THE SUPERINTENDENT THE FACT
THAT A SUSPECT HAS BEEN RELEASED FROM
ARREST STATUS WITHOUT CHARGES BEING
FILED.
(5) IN ANY CASE WHERE THE CRIMINAL
RECORD INFORMATION HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY
FORWARDED TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN-
VESTIGATION, ALL SUBSEQUENT ADDITIONS TO
THE CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION SHALL
LIKEWISE BE FORWARDED TO THE FEDERAL BU-
REAU OF INVESTIGATION.
Comment
Criminal records are seldom maintained in a current and
up-to-date condition. This section creates a central depository for
all criminal record information and requires that the records be
continually updated.
8 1
SEC. 3. DISSEMINATION OF CRIMINAL RECORD
INFORMATION.
(I) ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OF THIS
STATE OR ANY POLITICAL SUBDIVISION THERE-
OF MAY FURNISH CRIMINAL RECORD IN-
FORMATION TO ANY OTHER LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AGENCY UPON PROPER REQUEST STAT-
ING THAT THE INFORMATION REQUESTED WILL
BE USED SOLELY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE OFFICIAL DUTIES OF THAT AGENCY.
(2) THE SUPERINTENDENT MAY FURNISH
CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION TO ANY
AGENCY, PERSON, OR ORGANIZATION OF ANY
TYPE, PROVIDED THE REQUEST FOR IN-
FORMATION IS ACCOMPANIED BY A WRITTEN
AUTHORIZATION SIGNED AND ACKNOWLEDG-
ED BY THE PERSON ABOUT WHOM THE IN-
FORMATION IS REQUESTED. NO OTHER LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AGENCY OF THIS STATE SHALL
FURNISH CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION TO
SUCH AGENCIES, PERSONS, OR ORGANIZATIONS.
1 Subsection 4(b) of S. 2546, 92d Cong., I st Sess. (1971), requires only that operating
procedures be established which insure accurately revised records. No central depository
is created.
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Comment
This section maintains the freedom which law enforcement
agencies currently have to exchange information among them-
selves for law enforcement purposes. The availability of criminal
record information to private concerns, however, is drastically
curtailed.82 Violation of this section gives rise to penalties. See
Sec. 8 infra. Private concerns who are investigating an individual
for private purposes will be forced to seek authorization from the
person being investigated. Thus, the balance between public and
private interests is struck so that beneficial law enforcement may
proceed unimpeded, while private prying must be revealed. Better
control over dissemination of information to private "sources is
maintained by making that information available from the central
clearinghouse only, thus foreclosing all local agencies from sup-
plying that information.
SEC. 4. RETURN OF ARREST RECORDS.
IT SHALL BE THE MANDATORY DUTY OF ALL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO RETURN TO
ANY PERSON ARRESTED ALL ARREST RECORDS
PERTAINING TO THAT ARREST WHENEVER SAID
PERSON IS RELEASED WITHOUT A CRIMINAL
CHARGE BEING FILED AGAINST HIM, OR
WHENEVER A CHARGE IS FILED AND SUB-
SEQUENTLY DISMISSED; PROVIDED SUCH PER-
SON DEMANDS RETURN IN WRITING WITHIN
TEN DAYS OF THE RELEASE OR DISMISSAL. IN
THE EVENT OF SUCH DEMAND, THE ARREST
RECORDS SHALL BE RETURNED IMMEDIATELY
BY MAIL TO THE ADDRESS DESIGNATED IN THE
WRITTEN DEMAND, ALONG WITH THE DEMAND
ITSELF. IN THE CASE OF ELECTRONIC DATA,
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY SHALL CER-
TIFY THAT SUCH DATA HAS BEEN PER-
MANENTLY REMOVED FROM THE DATA BANK.
THE AGENCY SHALL FURTHER CERTIFY THE
NAMES OF ANY OTHER AGENCIES WHICH HAVE
BEEN FURNISHED WITH COPIES OF SAID ARREST
RECORD AND SHALL SEEK THE RETURN OF SAID
RECORDS FROM SAID AGENCIES.
82 S. 2546, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 3 (1971) allows access to criminal record information
only to law enforcement agencies. Exceptions are made only for those engaged in research
related to law enforcement and for individuals who believe that information concerning
them is being inaccurately or illegally maintained.
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Comment
An arrest record which does not result in criminal charges
being filed and prosecuted is most obnoxious to individual privacy
and least indicative of criminal character. However, this section
does not call for automatic expungement in such instances. In-
stead, this section places the onus upon the individual to protect
his own privacy by making a written demand for return. There is
some reason to anticipate that persons who are criminally inclined
will be less likely to make such a demand. On the other hand,
persons who are truly concerned about their reputations and
privacy can avail themselves of the demand machinery with very
little effort. The last sentence of this section is designed to advise
the person filing the demand of the fact that his arrest record has
already been forwarded to other agencies. Thus he is better able
to monitor the efforts of the local agency seeking the return of his
records from other agencies.83
The right to demand return based upon an acquittal of criminal
charges is covered in Sec. 5 infra.
SEC. 5. RETURN OF CRIMINAL RECORD IN-
FORMATION UPON ACQUITTAL.
(1) IT SHALL BE THE MANDATORY DUTY OF
ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO RETURN
TO ANY PERSON ACQUITTED OF A CRIMINAL
CHARGE ALL CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION
PERTAINING TO THAT CHARGE, PROVIDED
SUCH PERSON DEMANDS RETURN IN WRITING
WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER SAID ACQUITTAL IS
FINAL. IN THE EVENT OF SUCH DEMAND, THE
CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION SHALL BE RE-
TURNED IMMEDIATELY BY MAIL TO THE AD-
DRESS DESIGNATED IN THE WRITTEN DEMAND,
ALONG WITH THE DEMAND ITSELF. IN THE CASE
OF ELECTRONIC DATA, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY SHALL CERTIFY THAT SUCH DATA HAS
BEEN PERMANENTLY REMOVED FROM THE
DATA BANK. THE AGENCY SHALL CERTIFY THE
NAMES OF ANY OTHER AGENCIES WHICH HAVE
BEEN FURNISHED WITH COPIES OF SAID CRIMI-
No provision for the return of records of arrest or conviction is included in S. 2546,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). Nonetheless, the bill does require that procedures be devel-
oped for removing criminal record information based on considerations of age, nature of
the record, and a reasonable interval following the last release from the jurisdiction of a
law enforcement agency. Id. § 4(c).
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NAL RECORD INFORMATION OR ANY PART
THEREOF AND SHALL SEEK THE RETURN OF
SAID RECORDS FROM SAID AGENCIES.
(2) THIS SECTION SHALL NOT APPLY IF:
(a) THE PERSON HAS BEEN FINALLY CON-
VICTED OF THE SAME OFFENSE ON A PRIOR OC-
CASION WHICH CONVICTION HAS NOT BEEN RE-
MOVED FROM THE CRIMINAL RECORDS; OR
(b) THERE ARE OTHER CRIMINAL CHARGES
PENDING AGAINST THE PERSON AT THE TIME
THE DEMAND IS MADE; OR
(c) THE PERSON HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN
CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE INVOLVING MOR-
AL TURPITUDE WHICH CONVICTION HAS NOT
BEEN REMOVED FROM THE CRIMINAL RECORDS.
Comment
Similarly to Sec. 4, this section puts the onus on the person
most concerned to seek return of criminal record information. The
second part of this section sets forth certain exceptions to ex-
pungement which represent a circumstance where the public in-
terest in effective law enforcement outweights individual interest
in personal privacy. Furthermore, many individuals may want to
leave their record of acquittal on file rather than have it automat-
ically expunged.
SEC. 6. RETURN OF CRIMINAL RECORD IN-
FORMATION AFTER CONVICTION.
(1) ANY PERSON WITH A CONVICTION RECORD
MAY PETITION THE CONVICTING COURT FOR
AN ORDER ANNULLING AND RESCINDING THE
CONVICTION AND DIRECTING LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AGENCIES IN THIS STATE TO RETURN ALL
CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION PERTAINING
TO THE ARREST, CONVICTION, AND SENTENCE
IN QUESTION AND FURTHER DIRECTING ALL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN THIS STATE
TO SEEK RETURN OF SAID RECORDS FROM ANY
OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES KNOWN
TO POSSESS THE RECORDS OUTSIDE THE STATE.
(2) THE COURT SHALL SET A TIME FOR A
HEARING ON SUCH PETITION TO BE HELD NOT
MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS AFTER IT IS FILED,
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AND A COPY OF THE PETITION AND NOTICE OF
HEARING SHALL BE SERVED UPON THE LOCAL
PROSECUTOR AND THE HEAD OF THE LOCAL PO-
LICE FORCE.
(3) THE PETITION SHALL BE GRANTED WHEN-
EVER THE COURT FINDS THE FOLLOWING
FACTS AT THE HEARING:
(a) THE PETITIONER HAS FULLY DIS-
CHARGED HIS SENTENCE;
(b) PETITIONER'S PROBATION OR PAROLE (IF
ANY) WAS NOT REVOKED AT ANY TIME;
(c) THE PETITIONER IS NOT PRESENTLY
CHARGED WITH ANY CRIME;
(d) THAT FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS
FROM THE DATE OF EXPIRATION OF THE SEN-
TENCE IN QUESTION THE PETITIONER HAS NOT
BEEN CONVICTED OF A CRIME FOR WHICH A
JAIL TERM MAY BE ASSESSED; AND
(e) GRANTING THE ORDER WOULD AID THE
PETITIONER IN FURTHER REHABILITATION AND
WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC WEL-
FARE. SHOULD THE COURT FIND THAT GRANT-
ING THE ORDER WOULD NOT AID THE PETITION-
ER IN FURTHER REHABILITATION AND BE CON-
SISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC WELFARE, IT SHALL
SET FORTH THE REASONS FOR SUCH FINDING.
(4) ANY CONVICTION WHICH HAS BEEN RE-
MOVED FROM THE RECORDS BY ORDER OF A
COURT SHALL NOT THEREAFTER BE ADMIS-
SIBLE INTO EVIDENCE FOR ANY PURPOSE. THE
PETITION FOR THE ORDER AND THE RECORDS
OF THE HEARING SHALL BE SEALED AND MAY
NOT BE REOPENED FOR ANY PURPOSE EXCEPT
BY ORDER OF THE COURT.
Comment
When a person has been law-abiding for at least five years after
his conviction, there is good reason to believe that he is well on
the road toward complete rehabilitation, in which event the public
has little, if any, legitimate interest in knowing of his conviction.
Some statutes allow an expunged conviction to be used in
evidence at a subsequent trial for a different crime. Obviously,
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that practice results in less than complete expungement because
the record must remain available somewhere if it is to be offered
in evidence later. Therefore, the model adopted in this section
calls for complete expungement and encourages complete ex-
pungement by denying the use of the record at later trials. The
prosecution is thereby denied the opportunity to introduce evi-
dence of convictions over five years old, assuming those con-
victions have, in fact, been ordered expunged. This seems a small
price to pay when contrasted to the benefits complete ex-
pungement would bring to so many individuals who are diligently
seeking to regain a productive place in society.
The court retains discretion to deny the petition if it is not in
the best interests of all concerned. An example might be a case
where the petitioner was convicted of child molesting and has
been arrested, but not convicted, for the same offense on several
subsequent occasions during the five year period.
Only convictions that give rise to a "conviction record" (see
Sec. I supra) are treated in this section. Expunging convictions
for lesser offenses would possibly create too great a burden on the
courts in relation to the amount of good accomplished.
SEC. 7. THE EFFECT OF CRIMINAL RECORD IN-
FORMATION ON LICENSING APPLICATIONS.
(1) NO PERSON, BOARD, COMMISSION, BU-
REAU, OR OTHER ENTITY CHARGED WITH THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF LICENSING OR OTHERWISE
PERMITTING OR PROHIBITING PERSONS FROM
ENGAGING IN PARTICULAR OCCUPATIONS,
AVOCATIONS, PROFESSIONS, OR OTHER FORMS
OF GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT, SHALL DENY A LI-
CENSE OR PERMISSION BECAUSE OF AN ARREST
OR CONVICTION WHICH IS NOT CURRENTLY
MAINTAINED IN THE RECORDS OF THE STATE
CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION DEPART-
MENT.
(2) IN NO EVENT SHALL ANY SUCH PERSON,
BOARD, COMMISSION, BUREAU, OR OTHER EN-
TITY DENY SUCH LICENSE OR PERMISSION BE-
CAUSE OF A RECORD OF ARREST OR CON-
VICTION UNLESS THE FACTS INVOLVED IN SAID
ARREST OR CONVICTION CONSTITUTE A BONA
FIDE OCCUPATIONAL DISQUALIFICATION FOR
THE TYPE AND CHARACTER OF WORK SOUGHT
TO BE PERFORMED.
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(3) ANY APPLICANT DENIED A LICENSE OR
PERMISSION TO WORK BECAUSE OF A RECORD
OF ARREST OR CONVICTION SHALL BE EN-
TITLED TO APPEAR BEFORE THE PERSON,
BOARD, COMMISSION, BUREAU, OR OTHER EN-
TITY WHICH HAS MADE SAID DENIAL WITHIN
FIFTEEN DAYS, WHEREUPON THE APPLICANT
MAY PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE INDICATING
THAT HIS ARREST AND/OR CONVICTION IS NOT
A BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL DIS-
QUALIFICATION. THEREAFTER, THE PERSON,
BOARD, COMMISSION, BUREAU, OR OTHER EN-
TITY ISSUING THE DENIAL SHALL HAVE TEN
DAYS TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION.
(4) IF THE DENIAL IS NOT RESCINDED WITHIN
TEN DAYS OF THE HEARING DESCRIBED ABOVE,
THE APPLICANT MAY APPEAL TO THE DISTRICT
COURT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS THEREAFTER. THE
BURDEN OF PROOF SHALL BE UPON THE PER-
SON, BOARD, COMMISSION, BUREAU, OR OTHER
ENTITY MAKING THE DENIAL TO ESTABLISH IN
THE DISTRICT COURT THAT THE FACTS IN-
VOLVED IN THE ARREST AND/OR CONVICTION
CONSTITUTE A BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL DIS-
QUALIFICATION.
Comment
Licensing boards often consider criminal records even though
they have been expunged, thus negating the benefit of ex-
pungement legislation. This section requires licensing bodies to
honor the intent of the Act.
Not all records are eligible for expungement, and, doubtlessly,
many of those that are eligible will not be expunged, because the
individuals involved will not petition the court. Nevertheless, a
licensing board should not arbitrarily use a record of arrest or
conviction simply because it is available. The second and third
parts of this section prevent such arbitrary use. Licensing is legal
and proper if it serves the public health, or safety, or tranquillity.
However, licensing is repressive when licenses are denied without
any reasonable nexus between the character of the occupation
and the reasons for denying the license. The second and third
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parts of this section establish a mechanism for determining that
essential nexus.
84
SEC. 8. PENALTIES AND REMEDIES.
(1) ANY ARREST OR CONVICTION WHICH IS
NOT IN THE RECORDS OF THE STATE CRIMINAL
RECORD INFORMATION DEPARTMENT BECAUSE
SAID RECORDS HAVE BEEN REMOVED, AS PRO-
VIDED IN THIS ACT, SHALL BE DEEMED IN LAW
NOT TO HAVE OCCURRED, AND A PERSON MAY
LAWFULLY DENY THEIR OCCURRENCE WITH-
OUT BEING GUILTY OF PERJURY OR FALSE
SWEARING UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. IN
ANY APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT, OR LI-
CENSE, OR OTHER PERMISSION TO WORK, OR IN
ANY APPEARANCE AS A WITNESS, A PERSON
MAY NOT BE ASKED WHETHER OR NOT HE HAS
EVER SOUGHT THE RETURN OF ANY CRIMINAL
RECORD INFORMATION.
(2) ANY PERSON WITH RESPECT TO WHOM
CRIMINAL RECORD INFORMATION IS BEING
MAINTAINED, OR DISSEMINATED, OR USED IN
VIOLATION OF THIS ACT SHALL HAVE A CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR MAN-
DATORY INJUNCTION AGAINST THOSE RESPON-
SIBLE FOR SUCH VIOLATION AND SHALL BE
FURTHER ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM THEM
ACTUAL DAMAGES AND REASONABLE ATTOR-
NEY'S FEES AND OTHER COSTS OF LITIGATION
REASONABLY INCURRED. SHOULD IT BE FOUND
IN ANY SUCH ACTION THAT THE VIOLATION
WAS WILLFUL, THE VIOLATORS SHALL BE ADDI-
TIONALLY LIABLE FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
OF NOT LESS THEN ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS
AND NOT MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND DOL-
LARS.
(3) INTENTIONAL NEGLECT OR REFUSAL OF
ANY PERSON OR AGENCY TO MAKE THE RE-
PORTS REQUIRED BY THIS ACT, OR FAILURE TO
DO OR PERFORM ANY ACT REQUIRED BY VIR-
TUE OF THIS ACT, SHALL CONSTITUTE A CRIME:
84 Although S. 2546 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) contains no analogous provisions,
licensing bureaus would not have access to criminal record information. Id. § 3(a).
[VOL. 6:32
Abuses of Criminal Records
AND ANY PERSON, UPON CONVICTION THERE-
OF, SHALL BE PUNISHED BY A FINE OF NOT LESS
THAN ONE HUNDRED DOLLARD AND NOT MORE
THAN ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS.
(4) NOTHING IN THIS ACT SHALL AFFECT THE
RIGHT OF ANY PERSON TO APPEAL OR OTHER-
WISE CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF HIS AR-
REST OR CONVICTION IN BAR TO ANY SUB-
SEQUENT PROCEEDINGS.
Comment
Courts have been reluctant to enforce strictly legislation pre-
scribing restrictive use of criminal records. The remedies pro-
vided in this section have been chosen for two reasons. First, they
tend to dramatize for the courts the necessity of a posture of
aggressive enforcement and liberal interpretation in order that the
Act may accomplish its purpose. Second, these remedies facilitate
case-by-case litigation which may initially be necessary in order to
encourage some law enforcement agencies to obey the Act.a5
85 No provisions analogous to § 8(l) of this proposed act, are included in S. 2546, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). That bill, however, does authorize a civil cause of action for
damages, attorney's fees, and litigation costs. Id. § 5(a). Willful violation of the act is
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both. Id. § 5(b).
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